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The eminent naval historian David
Rosenberg once advised this reviewer
that serious readers of good naval history can expect one of three outcomes:
they will be entertained; they will be
informed; or they will be empowered.
The fortunate readers of this timely
book will fall into all three categories.
But above all, they will be empowered.
This book is a compendium of thirteen case studies of various wars and
campaigns by some of the most distinguished naval historians and analysts in
the United States, the United Kingdom,
and Australia. The case studies are short,
readable, and often exciting. Some of
the events are well known, others less
so. So the book will certainly entertain.
It also will certainly inform. Andrew
Lambert’s tale of the Royal Navy’s White
Sea campaign of 1854 contributes
enormously to our understanding of the
nineteenth century’s great global maritime war against Russia—misnamed the
Crimean War. (That real-world event
was a key progenitor of Admiral Mahan’s
formulation of a construct for a counterRussian war in “The Problem of Asia”
[1900] and of the concepts that underlay
the Reagan administration’s Maritime
Strategy of the 1980s.) Coeditor S. C.
M. Paine provides a fascinating analysis
of Japanese military and naval strategy during World War II, making the
point that peripheral and expeditionary
campaigns are not necessarily panaceas
but can even prove disastrous. Later in
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the volume, David Stevens reminds us
of the details of one of those campaigns,
in New Guinea—a campaign that while
peripheral to the great powers was
central to Australia, a country whose
military past must become much more
familiar to us as our focus shifts to the
Asia-Pacific. Bruce Elleman’s quick description of China’s 1974 naval expedition to the Paracels should be required
reading for anyone scanning today’s
headlines. Other chapters explore legal
issues in expeditionary campaigns and
shed fresh light on the Peninsular War,
Gallipoli, Mesopotamia, Guadalcanal,
Korea, Malaya, the Falklands, Iraq, and
the war on terror. John Hattendorf
contributes a short but perceptive
foreword, a perfect scene setter.
However, where the book truly excels
is as a vehicle of empowerment. In both
their analytical and well-argued introduction and conclusion, Elleman and
Paine propound a thesis that there are
insights to be gained from considering
naval expeditionary operations in peripheral areas as constituting a discrete
subset of military operations and that
those insights can be compounded by
comparing and contrasting the thirteen
cases under scrutiny. They are correct.
However, it will be the rare reader who
will buy completely into their characterization of the coherence of their
concept, and an even rarer one who will
not pause to think about the rationale
they present for including these specific
case studies. (Examples would be Peter
Jones’s discussion of the 2003 maritime
campaign in Iraq and John Reeves’s
treatment of the war on terror.) It can be
difficult to view, as the editors do, the relationship between the Pearl Harbor raid
and the Sino-Japanese War in the same
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light as that between the 1982 battle for
the Falklands/Malvinas and the Cold
War, or that between the U.S. Navy’s
contribution to Operations Enduring
Freedom and Iraqi Freedom and
the global war on terror. Their analogies sometimes appear forced and their
syntheses sometimes, well, stretched.
But far more important is the expansion in thinking that this book is sure
to engender. For all the debates with
the editors and authors that will arise in
readers’ minds as they turn the pages,
previously unthought-of concepts and
insights are bound to emerge as well.
Peripheral naval campaigns can win
a war or waste valuable resources in
profitless undertakings. This book
explains how and why this has happened, and it yields insights for future
planning. No serious reader who actively
engages with the arguments that the
editors present and the examples that
they provide will finish this provocative book without a greatly enlarged
understanding of the past, present, and
potential uses and limitations of naval
power. As we enter a new era of military
and naval operations, that understanding can empower us indeed, especially
the policy makers, staff officers, and
analysts who support those operations.
This, of course, is not the first time that
Professors Elleman and Paine have done
something like this. This book follows at
least two similar earlier efforts, a volume
on naval blockades and sea power and
one on naval coalition warfare. Like
those compendiums, Naval Power and
Expeditionary Warfare seeks to get its
arms around a topic vital for naval policy
and strategy today by looking to the past
for data and concepts. Like those earlier
volumes, it definitely succeeds. All in
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all, this is an important book for naval
historians, strategists, and operators to
engage with, learn from, and ponder.
Peter M. Swartz

CNA Strategic Studies, Alexandria, Virginia
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Economy of American Warfare 1945–2011. Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 2012. 313pp. $39.95

The last volume of Paul Koistinen’s fivevolume study of the political economy
of American warfare from the nation’s
colonial period of the seventeenth
century to the present day, this new
book analyzes U.S. foreign policy and
national defense from the end of World
War II to the present. In it Koistinen
studies the decisions and actions that led
to the development of the current U.S.
national security system and what was
termed by Dwight D. Eisenhower the
“military-industrial complex” (MIC).
This study includes a comprehensive
historical examination of the relationships among American political,
economic, and military institutions and
of the combined effects of U.S. policy
decisions. It is an assessment of the actions and decisions made by important
institutions in the U.S. national-security
establishment. Koistinen devotes a
chapter each to the presidency, Congress, the military, the defense industry,
the scientific community, and think
tanks in a consistently organized and
chronological assessment of key foreign
and domestic events, government policies, and institutional actions. The last
two chapters synthesize government
actions and policies, with their resulting impacts on the national economy.
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